Suspect packaging reaches the market by one of two routes: someone scanned and redrew a genuine pack and printed it elsewhere (a copy), or it was printed from your approved file above the ordered quantity and left the books (an overrun). With a copy you are looking for a counterfeiter; with an overrun you are looking inside your own supply chain. A scan tied to the signed file separates out a copy that lacks the signature, but only print reconciliation catches the overrun.
Why treat packaging as a separate risk from the product?
According to the 2022 Intellectual Property Crime Threat Assessment by Europol and EUIPO, packaging materials were the top category of counterfeit articles seized at the EU's external border in 2020. The report adds that packaging, logos and labels are usually shipped separately from the counterfeit goods, that these materials are not monitored or regulated at national or EU level, and that fake packaging is in many cases indistinguishable from the genuine article. Authorities have also found high-tech printers at illegal production sites.
Türkiye offers a similar example. Reporting on a 2018 fake pesticide operation across eight provinces describes suspects organised to produce everything at high volume, from packaging, labels and holograms to the contents. Figures and cases like these show that packaging can have its own production chain. They do not tell you where the box in your hand came from.
How does copied packaging come about?
A counterfeiter does not need your file. They buy a pack, scan or photograph it, rebuild the artwork, make their own plates and print wherever they choose. Colour, type sharpness or board quality sometimes give it away, but a well-printed copy will pass a visual check. We cover the limits of visual inspection separately.
How do overruns come about?
An overrun is not automatically a sign of bad faith. Printers run above the order to cover make-ready waste and cutting losses. The problem starts when nobody records where the surplus went. The usual leak points are:
- Surplus that was never delivered and spoilage that was never destroyed
- Stock from cancelled jobs or superseded artwork versions
- Plates, cylinders and files left at the printer after the job
- Work passed to a subcontractor without the brand's knowledge
- Surplus packaging left at the filling site or taken off the line
Because these packs come from the original file, and often the original press, do not expect to find a visual difference. Any security features on them are usually genuine too.
Which check catches which case?
| Case | Visual inspection | Invisible signature scan | Print reconciliation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Approved print run | Normal | Signature found | Quantities match |
| Overrun | Normal | Signature found, cannot separate it alone | Shows a gap |
| Leaked file printed elsewhere | Depends on the print | Signature may be found, does not rule out a leak | Blind, needs investigation |
| Scanned and redrawn copy | Noticed if the print is poor | Not genuine if it lacks the signature | Blind |
No single check closes all four rows. A measurement shows whether the pack was printed from the signed file; reconciliation shows whether it stayed within the approved quantity.
What records should you require from your printer?
Pharmaceutical rules offer a useful template. Chapter 5 of the EU GMP guide requires printed materials to be stored so as to exclude unauthorised access (5.46), each delivery to carry a specific reference number (5.47), obsolete versions to be destroyed with the disposal recorded (5.48), and significant discrepancies at reconciliation to be investigated (5.61). In the US, 21 CFR 211.125 requires reconciliation of labeling issued, used and returned (with an exception for cut and roll labeling that is 100 percent examined), and the destruction of excess labeling bearing lot or control numbers. Even if your sector falls outside these rules, you can put the same logic into a print contract:
- Quantity limits: the order quantity plus a written ceiling for acceptable overs and spoilage.
- End-of-job report: quantities printed, delivered, spoiled and destroyed for each job.
- Destruction record: date, quantity and responsible person for surplus and spoilage.
- Tooling and files: where plates and cylinders are kept after the job and who can access the files.
- Delivery identity: a reference number on each delivery that matches your packaging records.
- Subcontracting: no transfer of the job to another printer without written permission.
- Audit right: access to these records on notice.
The other half of the count sits with you. Unless packaging received, packaging used at filling and units produced are compared, the printer's report is one-sided. For high-risk work, ISO 14298:2021 is a useful reference: it sets management system requirements for security printers. Not every packaging job calls for it, but it gives a framework for writing the clauses above.
What should you do when suspect packaging turns up?
- Scan the pack, record the result with date and location, and photograph it. Repeat a negative result under different light and from another angle. The steps are set out in our field check guide.
- If there is no signature, work on the copy hypothesis: the sales channel, the source and the evidence file come first.
- If there is a signature, turn to your own chain: compare the artwork version, batch details, end-of-job reports and filling counts.
- If you doubt the contents, the packaging result is not enough. A genuine pack may have been refilled, so a laboratory result is needed as well.
What does Grafex do here, and what does it not do?
Grafex's invisible signature is generated from a brand-specific key; a copy that does not carry it does not get a genuine result at verification. A pack overprinted from the signed file does carry the signature; Grafex does not separate that case by itself, and print reconciliation is needed. Because scans are stored with date, location and channel, genuine results from an unexpected region can also offer a lead worth following. The scope is on the solutions page.
Sources
- Europol and EUIPO, Intellectual Property Crime Threat Assessment 2022
- TRT Haber, report on the fake pesticide operation (24 November 2018, in Turkish)
- European Commission, EudraLex Volume 4, Chapter 5: Production
- 21 CFR 211.125, Labeling issuance
- ISO 14298:2021, Graphic technology: Management of security printing processes (ISO)


